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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KARL R. LYMAN and EDITH K. 
LYMAN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs arnd Respondents, 
-vs.-
NATIONAL MORTGAGE BOND 
CORPORATION, a corporation of 
the State of Delaware; SAN JUAN 
COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, and all 
other persons unknown claiming 
right, title, estate or interest in or 
lien upon the real property de-
scribed in the complaint adverse to 
plaintiffs' ownership or clouding 
plaintiffs' title thereto, 
Defendants, 
AMALIA V. YBARRA, personally; 
AMALIA V. YBARRA as adminis-
tratrix of the Estate of Thomas V e-
larde, Deceased, 
Defendants and .Appell(]Jn.ts. 
PEriTION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case 
No. 8633 
Come now the plaintiffs and respondents and re-
spectfully petition the court to grant a rehearing and re-
consider the above case on the following grounds : 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. The court failed to give effect to its prior deci-
sions interpreting the so-called four year tax title statute, 
(see H(UJ!l.sen v. Morris, 3 Ut. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884, and 
Peterson/ v. Callister, 6 Ut. 2d 359, 313 P. 2d 814). 
2. In determining whether the so-called four year 
statute on tax titles was strictly a statute of limitations 
and determining the legislative intent in the enactment of 
this particular statute, the court erred in disregarding 
the preamble of the bill which was enacted by the 
Legislature. 
3. The court erred in holding that the limitation 
statutes only barred the right of the o,riginal owner to 
maintain an action where the tax title purchaser estab-
lishes a right of possession or ownership in the property. 
4. The court erred in stating that plaintiffs had 
failed to establish any valid elaim or right to the property 
in themselves, and that to hold for the plaintiffs would 
leave them in possession although they failed to estab-
lish any Yalid claim. 
5. The (~ourt erred in failing to determine that there 
had been payment of all taxes assessed against the prop-
erty for at least a four year period. 
FRANDSEN .A.ND l{ELLER. 
By Duane A. Frandsen, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Responden.ts 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts heretofore set forth in re-
spondents' brief is correct and of sufficient detail ade-
quately to present the fact situation. Reference is hereby 
made to the statement of facts in that brief. 
ARGU1'IENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE EFFECT TO 
ITS PRIOR DECISIONS INTERPRETING 
THE SO-CALI.1ED FOUR YEAR TAX TITLE 
STATUE. 
The question of the validity and the effect of the 
so-called four year statute of limitation on tax titles has 
been before the court on at least two other occasions. It 
was first before the court in the case of Han.sen v. Morris, 
3 Utah 2nd 310; 283 Pac. 2nd 884, decided on May 12, 
1955. In that case the court held that this four year stat-
ute on limitations on tax titles was constitutional and in 
commenting on the passage of the law which is now Sec. 
78-12-5.2, ·ucA 1953, the Court stated: 
"Another effort to provide a statute of limi-
tations designed to validate tax titles was made by 
passage of Chapter 19, 104-2, Laws of Utah 1951, 
78-12-5.2, UCA 1953 .... It appears obvious that 
such sections were enacted to eliminate the o bj ec-
tions pointed out in the Toronto case, and were 
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intended to prevent raising of defenses based on 
failure to comply with statutory steps leading 
down the long road traversable in perfecting tax 
titles, unless one claiming a better title assert his 
rights within four years after a document of trans-
fer, valid on its face, has been executed and de-
livered 'in the course of a statutory proceeding for 
the liquidation of any tax levied against*** prop-
erty whereby the property is relieved from a tax 
lien.' '' 
The construction of this four year statute of limi-
tations on tax titles and the legislative intent in enact-
ing the statute was again before the court in the case of 
Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2nd 359, 313 Pac. 2nd 814. 
In that case the court stated: 
''Title 78-12-5.1 is a statute of limitations 
which prevents the assertion of a defense by a rec-
ord owner if he has not had possession of the prop-
erty during a four year period after one has re-
ceived a tax title thereto . ... It is not unlike other 
statutes of limitation, such as those barring an 
action on negotable paper by passage of time. The 
obligation in such case may remain but the holder 
cannot enforce it .... It is a statute of repose, ob-
viously intended to lay at rest claims against tax 
titles which are asserted more than four years 
after acquisition of a tax title under statutory pro-
ceedings, and 'vhere the record owner has not had 
possession during that period. 
''We believe the legislature had in mind a four 
year statute of limitations barring claims against 
tax titles, which four year period dated from the 
initiation of the tax title, during which period any 
claimants against the tax title must have had pos-
session of the property to protect any claim he 
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might have. Any other interpretation does not 
square with the general nature and purpose of the 
act, and could lead to novel and, we believe, unin-
tended results, so as to defeat the entire purpose 
of a statute that seems to be designed to settle, not 
confuse, and to make certain, not uncertain, ti ties 
based on statutory liquidation of tax charges.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
/ In these two cases the court has clearly stated that 
the present four year statute of limitation was strictly a. 
statute of limitation which prevented the asserting of any 
defense or claim if the prior owner had been out of pos-
session for more than four years after one had received 
tax title thereto. No reference is made to any other re-
quirements, such as the other elements of adverse pos-
session or payment of taxes. To now hold that the other 
elements of adverse possession are necessary in order to 
establish a title is to completely disregard these other two 
former decisions which do not set up any such 
requirement. 
PoiNT II. 
IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE SO-
CALLED FOUR YEAR STATUTE ON TAX 
TITLES WAS STRICTLY A STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND DETERMINING THE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN THE ENACT-
MENT OF THIS PARTICULAR STATUTE, 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING 
THE PREAJ\1BLE OF THE BILL. WHICH 
WAS ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
The Legislature in 1951 when it enacted the four 
year statute of limitations on tax titles declared its inten-
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tion in the preamble of the act. This preamble makes no 
mention of other elements of adverse possession or other 
elements of ownership being necessary along with the 
running of the four year period of time in order for tax 
title holder to assert title under the particular act. The 
preamble to this act is set forth in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Worthen and is as follows: 
''An Act Amending Sections 104-2-5, DCA 
1943 as Amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah 
1943; 104-2-7 Utah Code Annotated 1943 and 104-
2-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and Repealing 
Section 104-2-5.10, as Amended by Chapter 19, 
Laws of Utah 1943 as Amended by Chapter 8, 
La"T~vs of Utah 1947, and Enacting New Laws to be 
l{nown as Sections 104-2-5.10 and 104-2-5.11, 
Limiting the peri-od within which actions may be 
commenced for recovery of real prop-erty sold and 
conveyed to the County under tax deed or for the 
possession thereof." (Emphasis added) 
How can there be any other construction placed on 
the preamble of this Act than that it "'\Yas intended strictly 
as a statute of limitations~? The legislature had already 
enacted laws which required the other elements of ad-
verse possession, including possession for a period of 
seven years, in order for one holding under a tax deed 
where there "'\Vas some defect in the proceeding to assert 
a valid title. vVith that la"T already enacted, the Legis-
lature added these t\vo additional sections \Yhich I haYe 
referred to herein as statutes of limitation. Had the Leg-
islature intended that the four year statute of limitations 
should be effective only after other elements of adverse 
possession "'"ere present, it '""ould haYt") amended the prior 
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law and made a proviso for a four year period where 
others claim under tax title rather than a seven year 
period which had theretofore prevailed. Instead of doing 
this the Legislature enacted new acts and entitled them 
Statute of Limitations. 
PorNT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE LIMITATION STATUES ONLY BARRED 
THE RIGHT OF THE ORIGINAL OWNER TO 
M.AINTAIN AN ACTION WHERE THE TAX 
TITLE PURCHASER ESTABLISHES A 
RIGHT OF POSSESSION OR OWNERSHIP 
IN THE PROPERTY. 
As stated above in Point II, the Legislature by en-
acting two new sections and calling them Statutes of Limi-
tations and also by the Preamble of the Act, intended 
that such enactments should be strictly statutes of limi-
tations and not dependent upon establishing other ele-
ments of adverse possession or ownership. To hold other-
wise gives no effect to the new sections enacted and goes 
back to the prior statutes which required all of the ele-
ments of adverse possession. The holding of the court 
leaves a county in an impossible situation regarding the 
tax titles it receives through the May sale. In order for 
the four year statute to be effective there must be some of 
these other elements of ownership or adverse possession 
as stated by the court. In most instances a county, after 
receiving title to tax property at the May sale, does not 
go into possession, but the property stays as is until 
some interested purchaser comes along who is interested 
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in purchasing it either under contract or by paying the 
full purchase price. Under the court's decision an origi-
nal owner could abandon his property and not pay any 
taxes thereon for an extended period of years, such as the 
26 year period in the instant case. The property still 
standing in the name of the county could be recovered 
back by the original owner after these many years have 
elapsed if there was some defect in the tax proceedings. 
Under these circumstances the county could not get the 
benefit of the four year statute because the county itself 
had not entered into actual possession of the property and 
no purchaser had come to buy the property so that the 
land remained idle. Likewise the county would lose the 
revenue which it might otherwise have collected if the 
property had remained on the tax rolls and been assessed 
against the original owner. This was the very problem 
that the enactment of the four year statute of limitations 
on tax title was intended to correct. To hold otherwise 
places a premium on land owners not paying their taxes 
and allowing them to go to the county and held and 
owned by the county for any period of time until a pros-
pective purchaser attempts to acquire the tax title and 
go into possession of the property·. The original o·wner 
could keep 'vatch on the property and before the four 
years had run, after the purchaser from the county went 
into possession, the original O\vner could file an action to 
quiet his title and he \Vould not be barred by the four 
yPnr statute of limitations e\Ten though the county had 
held the property for 12 to 15 years as in the instant case 
prior to the sale to thr nc\Y purchaser. 
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~As stated in the Hansen v. Morris Case, supra, this 
problem was the very situation that the enactment of 
these statutes of limitation sections were designed to 
prevent, but with the holding of the court in the instant 
case the situation is not corrected and the problem still 
prevails. It \vas not the intention of the Legislature to 
allow an original land owner to come in 26 years after 
he had stopped paying tax on the property and the land 
had gone to the county for non-payment of taxes, and be 
able to assert his claim against a bona fide purchaser 
from the county. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
ANY VALID CLAIM OR RIGHT TO THE 
PROPERTY IN THEMSELVES, AND THAT 
TO HOLD FOR THE PLAINTIFFS WOULD 
LEAVE THEM IN POSSESSION ALTHOUGH 
THEY FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY VALID 
CLAIM. 
The plaintiffs do have a valid claim. They hold under 
a tax title deed from San Juan County. The only reason 
that this tax title deed from San Juan County does not 
give good, full ownership is that in some of the prior 
proceedings there was an omission to attach an affi-
davit to one of the assessment rolls. The plaintiffs come 
into title under a written instrument and they have color 
of title. 
Possession is a major factor in ownership and pos-
session alone is recognized by the law in many instances. 
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One example is possession of a m1n1ng claim under a 
Notice of Location. A party may not have a valid mining 
claim because he has not as yet made a valid discovery of 
ore; yet if he is in possession of the claim and attempting 
to discover and find ore so that he has a valid discovery, 
he has prior rights to that claim and his possession bars 
others from asserting any title to the claim or attempting 
to locate the area. 
Another example of where possession alone can ripen 
into ownership is in the case of easements. A party by 
adversely using another's land for a period of 21 years 
without any claim of ownership and "~ithout any payment 
of taxes and without any benefits to the land owner 
acquires an easement right which is the right to continue 
to adversely use the land after the 21 year period. There 
is, therefore, no traversity to the law to recognize a right 
of possession in the tax title claimant which right of 
possession would ripen into a right of ownership and a 
source of title through adverse possession initiated by his 
tax title purchase. Recognizing this four year statute as 
strictly a. statute of limitation without the other elements 
of adverse possession would leave the tax title claimant 
in possession of the property, if four ~Tears had expired 
from the time that the property 'Yas taken from the origi-
nal owner for failure to pay the taxes. This is by reason 
of the express wording of the statute, 'Yhich states that 
the original owner cannot assert any title or defense after 
this four yenr period. 
This problem of the tax title claimant remaining in 
possession has already been considered by the Court in 
10 
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]:Jeterson v. Callister, ~upra. The portion of that case here-
inabove quoted, and particularly those portions in italics, 
hold that the tax title claimant may remain in possession 
of the land by reason of the four year Statute of 
I~imitations. 
PoiNT V. 
TIIE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DE-
TER~IINE THAT THERE HAD BEEN PAY-
MENT OF ALL TAXES ASSESSED AGAINST 
THE PROPERTY FOR AT LEAST A FOUR 
YEAR PERIOD. 
This question is discussed under Point 3 of Plain-
tiff's first Brief filed herein, and involves a determina-
tion of whether redemption of taxes before the May sale 
to the County is equivalent to the payment of taxes before 
they are delinquent. The prior Utah case of Bowen v. 
Olson, 2 U t. 2d 12, 268 P. 2d 983, holds that redemption is 
not equivalent to payment of taxes. We respectfully sub-
, 
mit that in light of the new decisions in other jurisdictions 
cited in our first Brief under Point 3, pages 13, 14, and 15, 
the Bowen v. Olson case should be overruled and the Court 
follow the rule of Virginia, California, Montana, and 
other jurisdictions that redemption prior to the May sale 
is equivalent to payment of the taxes before they become 
delinquent after November 30th. 
We respectfully submit that a rehearing should be 
granted and the matter reconsidered by the court and 
that the four year statute on tax title be recognized as a 
11 
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statute of limitation without reference to the other ele-
ments and requiremens of adverse possession as required 
in the court's opinion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANDSEN AND KELLER 
By Duane A. Frandsen 
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